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 use suWe conduct an experiment in which subjects face the same questions
repeated multiple times, with repetitions of two types: (1) following
the literature, the repetitions are distant from each other; (2) in a novel
treatment, the repetitions are in a row, and subjects are told that the
questions will be repeated. We find that a large majority of subjects ex-
hibit stochastic choice in both cases. We discuss the implications for
models of stochastic choice.I. IntroductionA consistent finding regarding individual decisionmaking is the phenom-
enon of stochastic, or random, choice: when asked to choose from the
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he pattern of stochastic choice was first reported in Tversky (1969), in which subjects
presented with 10 pairs ofmonetary gambles 20 times, separated by decoys. A large frac-
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stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 41Stochastic choice is documented in many environments, including those
in which subjects have no value for experimentation (e.g., when there is
no feedback) and those in which there are no bundle or portfolio effects
(e.g., when only one choice is paid).
This robust finding has led to the development of a large body of the-
oretical models that capture this behavior. These models can be ascribed
to three broad classes: (1) models of random utility, in which subjects’ an-
swers change because their preferences change stochastically; (2)models
of bounded rationality, in which subjects have stable preferences but ex-
hibit stochastic choice as theymay fail to choose the best option for them;
and (3) models of deliberate randomization, in which subjects deliberately
choose to report different answers because it is optimal for them to do
so (e.g., to minimize regret or to hedge between options).
The goal of this paper is to shed light on the origin of stochastic choice
and, in particular, to inform the three broad classes of theories described
above.
We use the following design. Subjects are asked tomake several choices
between objective lotteries and are paid for one random decision round
out of all rounds played. In the first part of the experiment, we replicate a
standard design: subjects are asked a set of questions repeated several
times, with the repetitions distant from each other (separated by other
questions); subjects are not told in advance of these repetitions. The
novelty of our experiment is to introduce a second part in which subjects
face the same question three times in a row and are explicitly told that
each question will be repeated three times.
As a further test of the desire to randomize, for some questions, sub-
jects are allowed to choose either one of two lotteries or a (computer-
simulated) coin flip to determine which lottery they are assigned; select-
ing the coin has a small fee.
We also elicit subjects’ attitudes toward risk, compound lotteries, and
their proneness to violate expected utility as captured by the Allais par-
adox. Finally, as we wish to study the motivation underlying stochastic
choice, in a nonincentivized questionnaire distributed at the end of
the experiment, we ask subjects directly if, and why, they choose different
answers when questions are repeated in a row.
Our main findings are the following.
First, in linewithprevious results, the vastmajority of participants (90per-
cent) choose different lotteries in the three repetitions of the same ques-tion of subjects gave different answers to the samequestion.Many studies have replicated this
result, focusing on choices between risky gambles: Camerer (1989a), Starmer and Sugden
(1989), Hey andOrme (1994), Ballinger andWilcox (1997),Hey (2001), Regenwetter, Dana,
and Davis-Stober (2011), and Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2012).
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Alltion when these repetitions are distant from each other. They tend to do
so for at least half of the questions within the class of questions for which
stochastic choice is prevalent.
Second, a large majority of subjects (71 percent) select different lotter-
ies also when questions are repeated three times in a row and they are
explicitly told about the repetition. Those who exhibit stochastic choice
do so multiple times. Stochastic choice behavior is strongly correlated in
the two cases (distant and in-a-row repetitions).
Third, in both cases, stochastic choice is present almost exclusively in
questions in which none of the available options is “clearly better” than
the other (what we call “hard” questions); it is extremely frequent for
these questions and virtually absent for others. This distinction is the
strongest predictor of stochastic choice in our data. Hard questions are
not necessarily the questions in which the expected values, or utilities,
are the closest. In fact, differences in expected utility between the options
have limited predictive power in determining the stochasticity of choice
in our data and cannot account for the variation in stochastic choice.
Fourth, 29 percent of the subjects choose the option to flip a (costly)
coin at least once (most of these subjects did somultiple times), again only
for hard questions.
We note two additional patterns. Stochastic choice is significantly cor-
related with violations of expected utility à la Allais but generally not with
risk aversion or attitude toward compound lotteries. Also, the analysis
of response time shows that subjects behave very differently in distant
versus in-a-row repetitions.
We concludeour analysis by looking at the answers to thefinal question-
naire in which subjects provided reasons for making different choices
in the in-a-row repetitions of the same question. We find that almost all
subjects who gave different answers with in-a-row repetitions reported
doing so in the questionnaire and that the vast majority (79 percent) re-
ported doing so deliberately. Typical motivations given by subjects were
about hedging and diversification.
To frame our analysis, we extend existing models of stochastic choice
so that they make predictions about distant and in-a-row choices. For
models of random utility, we consider the random expected utility model
of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006), and we posit that the stochastic compo-
nent of the utility does not change for in-a-row repetitions. For models of
bounded rationality, we consider the drift diffusion model of Ratcliff
(1978) and Ratcliff andMcKoon (2008), and we posit that the agent does
not collect more information for those repetitions. For models of delib-
erate randomization, we consider the cautious stochastic choice model
of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2016).
We interpret our results as suggesting that the main driving force be-
hind stochastic choice in our data is the deliberate desire of the subjectsThis content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 43to choose different answers, which is consistent with models of deliber-
ate randomization and not with models in other classes. We find that a
small fraction of subjects, 6 percent, never exhibit stochastic choice.
We also find that 23 percent report stochastic choice for distant but
not for in-a-row repetitions, consistent with models of random expected
utility and bounded rationality. However, neither of these two classes
of models, under our assumptions, can account for the behavior of the
majority of subjects, 61 percent, that report stochastic choice for both dis-
tant and in-a-row repetitions. Models of deliberate randomization instead
correctly predict stochastic choice behavior in both cases. They also pre-
dict the correlation between stochastic choice and the Allais-like behavior
observed in the data. This interpretation of stochastic choice is also sup-
ported by the open-ended answers to the questionnaire.
It is important to stress that we can test only among these classes ofmod-
els because of the intertemporal structure that we add to the random util-
ity and bounded rationality models. Our data do not, for example, rule
out a random utility model in which choice-specific utility shocks arise
for consecutive questions that the agent knows are identical. Our imple-
mentation is consistent with how random utility models are often inter-
preted (see Luce [1958], Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak [1963b], and
the discussion in Sec. II), but under other interpretations, our tests would
not be decisive.
To test the robustness of our findings, we ran three additional short ex-
periments. In the first, we asked only one of the questions from our main
experiment, repeated three times in a row, with 10 times higher stakes.
Half of the subjects chose different answers in the three repetitions, a
fraction very similar to that observed in the main experiment for the
same question. The second and the third short experiments asked again
only one question repeated three times, but questions were no longer
about lotteries: in the second short experiment, the question offered a
choice between different amounts of money at different moments in
time (time preferences); in the third, it is was a choice between different
allocations to different participants (social preferences). We find that
34 percent and 42 percent, respectively, report stochastic answers in each
of these experiments.
This paper is related to the experimental literature on choice under
uncertainty (Camerer 1995) and in particular to the studies on stochastic
choice and preferences for randomization. Hey and Carbone (1995) test
experimentally whether preferences are deterministic while choice is sto-
chastic; their results rule out this possibility. Becker, DeGroot, and Mar-
schak (1963a) and Sopher and Narramore (2000) ask subjects to choose
between two lotteries and a convex combination of them anddocument a
strong tendency to choose the latter. Rubinstein (2002) documents a de-
liberate desire to report “diversified” answers even when this leads themThis content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
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Allto strictly dominated choices.2 We document similar patterns, but in our
case, the tendency to diversify appears only for hard questions and does
not generate violations of first-order stochastic dominance. The experi-
ment of Kircher, Ludwig, and Sandroni (2013) is a version of the dictator
game in which the dictators can choose either €7.5 for themselves and €0
to the recipient, €5 to both, or a lottery between the options above. They
find that approximately one-third of the subjects chose to randomize.
This finding is in line with the result of our robustness test on social pref-
erences and with the broader notion of preferences for randomization.
Finally, in a recent and independent study, Dwenger, Kübler, and Weiz-
säcker (2016) explore, both in the laboratory and in real data, whether
subjects wish to delegate their choice to an external device to avoid mak-
ing decisions. They find that between 15 percent and 53 percent of sub-
jects choose lotteries between available allocations, indicating an explicit
preference for randomization, and discuss how their experimental data
are consistent with a theory of responsibility aversion. They also show sim-
ilar patterns using the data from a clearinghouse for university admis-
sions inGermany, where the applicationprocess is such that studentsmust
submit multiple rankings of the universities they would like to attend.
These rankings are submitted at the same moment in time, but only one
of them matters. They find that a significant fraction of students report
inconsistent rankings, even when there are no strategic reasons to do so.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the implications of the theoretical models in each class. Section III pre-
sents the experimental design, and the results are analyzed in Section IV.
SectionV discusses the three robustness experiments. SectionVI concludes
the paper. The online appendix contains additional analysis and experi-
mental instructions.II. Models of Stochastic ChoiceWe now turn to describe the three main classes of models of stochastic
choice: random utility/preferences, bounded rationality, and deliberate
randomization. While each class includes many, often dozens, of models,
they tend to have many features in common. For each class, we select
one prominent model, describe it in detail, and discuss its implications
for our behavior of interest.2 Other recent studies document “false diversification.” In the experiment of Chen and
Corter (2006), subjects chose an irrational mixture of options, including dominated ones,
in multiple-trial decisions over pure bundles. In Eliaz and Fréchette (2008), a significant
fraction of subjects paid to switch from a lottery that pays in only one state to one that pays
in more states, even though the overall distribution remains constant.
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stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 45Consider an interval [w, b] of monetary prizes and the set D of prob-
ability distributions (lotteries) over them, with generic elements p, q. We
are interested in the stochastic choice function r of the agent: a map that
associates a probability measure r(A) over A to each finite subset A of D.
It represents the frequency with which each element of A is chosen as-
suming that the choice from A is asked repeatedly. While typically no dis-
cussion is made regarding the frequency of these repetitions, the key fea-
ture of our experiment is that we study stochastic choice in two distinct
cases.
Distant Repetitions. The agent is asked to choose between two lot-
teries multiple times, with each repetition distant from the other; the
agent is not told that the questions are repeated.
Repetitions in a row. The agent is asked to choose between two lot-
teries multiple times, with repetitions in a row; the agent is explicitly told
that each question will be repeated multiple times in a row and the num-
ber of repetitions.
Random utility.—A well-known class of models of stochastic choice is
that of random utility, or random preferences, according to which when
subjects make a decision, they maximize a well-defined utility function
(or preference), but this changes stochastically over time.3 The relevant
model for our analysis of choice over lotteries is random expected utility
(REU), studied in Gul and Pesendorfer (2006):4 the agent has a proba-
bility distribution m over strictly increasing utility functions over money,
with support U. The probability of choosing p from a set A is equal to the
probability that the agent has a utility that, among the elements of A, is
uniquely maximized at p.5 That is, for all p ∈ A,
rðAÞðpÞ 5 mð u ∈ U : uðpÞ > uðqÞ for all q ∈ Af gÞ:
The common interpretation of why the utility function is stochastic
suggests that the subject’s utility changes because of changes in exoge-
nous, unobservable subjective and objective conditions, such as informa-3 See Thurstone (1927), Luce (1959), Becker et al. (1963b), Harsanyi (1973), Falmagne
(1978), Cohen(1980), Barberá andPattanaik (1986),McFadden andRichter (1991), Loomes
and Sugden (1995), Clark (1996), Gul and Pesendorfer (2006), McFadden (2006), Ahn and
Sarver (2013), Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015), and Apesteguia and Ballester (forthcom-
ing).
4 In principle, one can consider a random utility model with non–expected utility pref-
erences. This type of more general model would include features of both random utility
and deliberate randomization models (discussed below) because subjects may have both
a changing utility and an explicit desire to randomize.
5 This is what Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) call a regular random utility function with
countably additive measure. The only difference is that in Gul and Pesendorfer’s study, lot-
teries are defined over arbitrary prizes, while we focus on monetary lotteries; we thus posit
that utilities are strictly increasing.
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Alltion, mood, social situation, framing, and so forth (see, among many,
Harsanyi 1973; Gul and Pesendorfer 2006; McFadden 2006).6
Motivated by the interpretation above, we denote by REU* the REU
model in which the utility function is fixed for repetitions in a row but
can vary across distant repetitions. It is REU* that we will test in our ex-
periment. According to this model, we can observe stochastic choice
with distant repetitions but not with repetitions in a row. Note also that
under REU*, subjects will never choose a first-order stochastically dom-
inated option.
Bounded rationality.—A second class of models assume that subjects
have a well-defined and stable ranking of the available options but may
not choose the alternative that maximizes it because of some form of
bounded rationality.7
We illustrate this class of models using the drift diffusion model
(DDM) of Ratcliff (1978) and Ratcliff and McKoon (2008). Suppose that
the agent must choose between two options, p and q, with values u(p)
and u(q). At every instant, she receives a noisy signal in favor of one of
them. Assuming that positive values indicate that p is better (negative in-
dicating the opposite), at each instant the agent adds all the evidence
accumulated and does one of the following: chooses p if the accumu-
lated evidence is above a threshold b > 0, chooses q if it is below 2b,
and continues to acquire information otherwise. The accumulated evi-
dence X(t) starts at 0 and evolves according to
X ðtÞ 5 X ðt 2 1Þ 1 a½uðpÞ 2 uðqÞ 1 eðtÞ,
where a ∈ (0, 1), a½uðpÞ 2 uðqÞ is the drift rate of the process, and e(t) is
an independent and identically normally distributed noise (mean zero,
unitary variance).
The predictions of the DDM for the case of distant repetitions are
clear. Agents will choose more frequently the option with a higher utility
but may make mistakes and exhibit stochastic choice. This can happen
for any question, including those involving first-order stochastic domi-
nance (FOSD). Stochastic choice will be more frequent the smaller the
expected utility difference between the two options, as the drift is smaller6 Since the early contributions in this literature, there has been a discussion on how to
test models with changing utilities experimentally and estimate the choice probabilities as
independent. Various papers suggested that for this to be meaningful, repetitions should
be far apart and subjects should be unaware of them (e.g., Luce 1958, 217; Becker et al.
1963b, 45).
7 See, amongmany, Busemeyer andTownsend (1993),Camerer andHo (1994),Harless and
Camerer (1994), Hey and Orme (1994), Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Ratcliff and McKoon
(2008),Wilcox (2011), Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014),Woodford (2014), Fudenberg
and Strzalecki (2015), and Natenzon (2015); see also Johnson and Ratcliff (2013) for reviews.
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stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 47in this case. For these questions, the response time should also be longer
(as the process is more likely to take longer to reach the threshold).
Denote by DDM* the DDM model with the modification that no addi-
tional information is collected when the same question is asked multiple
times in a row and the agent is aware that it is the same question.8 It is
DDM* that we will test in our experiment. According to this model, sto-
chastic choice can be observed with distant repetitions but not with rep-
etitions in a row. Note that under DDM*, response times should be shorter
in the second and third consecutive repetitions of the same choice.
Deliberate randomization.—A third class of models of stochastic choice
postulates that the stochasticity is a deliberate choice of the agent.9 We
illustrate this class using the cautious stochastic choice (CSC) model of
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2016); identical predictions hold for the other
models.
We add the following notation. For any set A, note that r(A) is a prob-
ability distribution over lotteries, thus a compound lottery, and denote
by rðAÞ the lottery it induces over final outcomes, that is, rðAÞ ≔
oq∈ArðqÞq. For any subset A of D, denote by co(A) its convex hull.
In the CSC model, the agent has a compact set of utility functions W
over monetary amounts, all of which are continuous, strictly increasing,
and concave. The stochastic choice is then represented by
rðAÞ ∈ argmax
p ∈ coðAÞ
V ðpÞ,
where
V ðpÞ 5 min
v ∈W
v21ðEqðvÞÞ:
Themodel has two components. First, when subjects are asked to choose
from a set A, they do not just consider the options in A but rather con-
sider all possible randomizations over them and choose the optimal one
according to V. They may deliberately choose to randomize in case the
utility of the mixture is higher than that of the two options: if V ð12 p 1
1
2 qÞ > V ðpÞ, V ðqÞ, then from {p, q }, they would sometimes choose p and
sometimes q. Their preference for randomization comes from the sec-8 Indeed, if it was optimal for the agent to collect more information, she should have
done so before answering the first of the repetitions.
9 First suggested in Machina (1985), models in this class proposed different reasons for
the desire to randomize: to minimize regret (Dwenger et al. 2016) or because subjects have
non–expected utility preferences and wish to hedge between options (Marley 1997; Swait
and Marley 2013; Henderson, Hobson, and Tse 2014; Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki
2015; Cerreia-Vioglio et al. 2016).
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Allond component of the model, the shape of V, that follows the cautious
expected utility model of Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger, and Ortoleva
(2015). The agent has a set of utility functionsW, and she values a lottery
p as follows: for every utility v in W, she computes the certainty equiva-
lent of the lottery, v21ðEpðvÞÞ; she evaluates p as the smallest of these cer-
tainty equivalents. This may lead to a desire to hedge between options: if
p is good for one utility but bad for another and q is the opposite, by mix-
ing between p and q, the agent obtains a lottery that is not too bad for
both utilities. This agent may therefore have a desire to randomize be-
tween p and q, leading to stochastic choice.
The predictions of the CSCmodel are clear: the agent may exhibit sto-
chastic choice both when repetitions are distant and when they are in
a row.III. Design of the ExperimentThe experiment is composed of four parts. The complete instructions
and screenshots are presented in online appendices B and C. Subjects
received general instructions about the experiment and specific instruc-
tions about part I when they entered the room. Separate instructions
were distributed (or displayed on the screen) at the beginning of each
of the following parts.
The main parts of the experiment are parts I and III, in which subjects
were asked many questions repeated multiple times. In part I, repeti-
tions of the same question were far apart, and subjects were not told that
questions would be repeated. In part III, the three repetitions were asked
in a row, and subjects were explicitly told that each question would be re-
peated three times. Between parts I and III, we measured subjects’ risk
and compound lottery attitudes using an investment task; this part was
meant to break the repetitiveness of the questions in parts I and III and
to reduce fatigue. After part III, wemeasured violations of expected utility.
We concluded the experiment with a nonincentivized questionnaire.
In most rounds, subjects were asked to select one of the lotteries dis-
played on the screen. Each lottery paid a certain number of tokens de-
pending on the roll of a four-sided fair die with faces named A, B, C,
and D (simulated by a computer). Thus, all the lotteries had at most four
different outcomes occurring with probabilities .25, .5, .75, or 1. Each
lottery was presented as a table that listed the number of tokens paid
for each face of the die.
Throughout the experiment, we repeatedly asked the same 10 basic
questions, each involving the choice between two lotteries. Table 1 con-
tains the 10 questions. They can be divided into three groups: FOSD,
EASY, and HARD. The first included two lotteries, one of which was
first-order stochastically dominated by the other. EASY questions in-This content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
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stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 49volved lotteries with no first-order stochastic dominance but in which
one lottery was “clearly better” than the other. By contrast, each of the
four HARD questions had no “obvious winner” between two lotteries.10
In part I, subjects played 40 decision rounds with each of the 10 ques-
tions repeated four times in different orders. These were designed to
guarantee that each question would not appear too close to its repetition.
In three of the four repetitions, subjects observed exactly the same ques-
tion displayed in exactly the same way.11 In the remaining repetition, in
addition to the two lotteries, subjects were also offered the option to have
the computer flip a (simulated, fair) coin to determine which of the two
lotteries would be assigned to them. This third option, however, was not
free: if chosen, 1 token would be subtracted from the amount won.
Part II included two investment tasks. In the first, developed by Gneezy
and Potters (1997) and Charness and Gneezy (2010), subjects were en-
dowed with 100 tokens and chose how many to invest in a risky project
that has a 50 percent chance of success and returns two and a half times
the investment if successful, and nothing otherwise. The number of to-TABLE 1
List of Questions Asked
Lottery 1 Lottery 2
Question (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference
in Expected
Value
FOSD1 98 98 98 98 103 103 103 103 5
FOSD2 17 17 18 18 17 17 17 17 .5
FOSD3 10 20 30 30 70 100 120 190 97.5
EASY1 23 23 30 30 5 5 5 31 15
EASY2 12 14 16 96 85 85 85 85 50.5
EASY3 100 100 100 100 20 20 20 101 59.75
HARD1 38 38 38 77 16 16 94 94 7.25
HARD2 10 10 90 90 32 45 45 56 5.5
HARD3 6 84 105 200 54 60 117 135 7.25
HARD4 13 30 51 81 19 32 38 86 010 The desig
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Allkens invested can be used to estimate the subject’s risk aversion. The sec-
ond task was identical to the first except that the success of the investment
was determined by a compound lottery that reduces to a 50 percent
chance of success. Subjects with neither aversion nor attraction to com-
pound lotteries should invest the same number of tokens in both ques-
tions; subjects who dislike (like) compound lotteries might decide to in-
vest less (more) in the second investment task.
In part III, subjects were again asked seven out of the 10 questions
used in part I, repeated multiple times: FOSD1, EASY1, EASY2, HARD1,
HARD2, HARD3, and HARD4. As opposed to part I, the questions were
asked three times in a row, for a total of 21 decision rounds. Subjects were
explicitly told that each question would be repeated three times in a row.
Finally, part IVof the experiment asked standard variations of the com-
mon ratio and common consequences effects of Allais (1953). The exper-
iment concluded with a questionnaire in which subjects were asked ques-
tions regarding their choices. In particular, subjects were asked whether
they chose different answers in the repetitions of the same question in
part III and, if so, why they did so.
All sessions were conducted at the California Social Science Experi-
mental Laboratory at University of California, Los Angeles, in January
2013.12 Subjects were recruited from a database of volunteer undergrad-
uate students. Four identical sessions were run, for a total of 80 subjects.
No subject participated in more than one session. Each session lasted ap-
proximately 45 minutes, and average earnings were $19.
The payment of subjects comprised several parts. First, they received a
$10 show-up fee for completing the experiment. Second, subjects were
paid for one decision round, randomly selected with equal probability
from all rounds in parts I and III (combined). Because the amounts paid
by each lottery were described in tokens, these were converted into US
dollars using the rate 20 tokens 5 $1. The procedure in which only
one decision round is paid is standard and is used to avoid incentives
to choose different answers to the same questions to create a portfolio.
Third, subjects were paid for all decisions made in parts II and IV, which
are less prone to portfolio concerns. These tokens were converted into
US dollars using the rate 100 tokens5 $1. The different conversion rate
in parts II and IV was chosen to reflect the difference in the scales of
earnings and to create strong incentives for subjects to think hard about
choices in parts I and III, which are the primary focus of the experiment.
Subjects received no feedback about their earnings throughout the
experiment. However, at the end of each decision round, the lottery cho-12 The software was programmed as server/client applications in Java, using the open-
source experimental software Multistage (http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu/).
This content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 51sen by a subject was played out by the computer, and its outcome was re-
corded by the software but not revealed to the subject. Subjects were in-
formed about this. At the end of the experiment, subjects learned how
much money they earned in total and were paid in cash privately.IV. Results
A. Behavior in Parts I and IIFigure 1 presents the fraction of subjects who give inconsistent answers
in parts I and III in the repetitions of each question, at least once for
questions in each class (FOSD, EASY, and HARD) and at least once over-
all (ALL).
In part I, where repetitions are distant, the vast majority of participants
(90 percent) choose different lotteries in the three repetitions of the same
question. This is in line with existing evidence. This stochastic behavior is
not only widespread across subjects but also frequent for each subject:
the majority (60 percent) of those that exhibit stochastic choice do so
for at least half of theHARD questions (two ormore out of four). A strong
additional pattern emerges: stochastic behavior is present essentially only
in HARD questions and is almost absent in EASY and FOSD ones. Fisher
exact tests confirm that the proportion of subjects who give inconsistent
answers in HARD questions is significantly higher than that in EASY ques-
tions (p < .01) and that in FOSD questions (p < .01), while there is no sta-
tistical difference between those reporting inconsistent answers in EASY
and in FOSD questions (p 5 .443).
Themain finding of our experiment is the behavior in part III, in which
questions are repeated three times in a row. A large majority of subjects
(71 percent) reported inconsistent answers in this case as well. Just as in
part I, this behavior takes place essentially only forHARDquestions (Fisher
exact test: p < .01 for HARD vs. EASY, p < .01 for HARD vs. FOSD, and p5
.059 for EASY vs. FOSD). While indeed the proportion of subjects who re-
ported inconsistent answers in part III is smaller than that in part I (Fisher
exact test, p 5 .005), it still involves the large majority of the population.
Similarly to part I, in part III not only do most subjects report inconsis-
tent answers, but they do so more than once: the majority (70 percent)
of subjects who report inconsistent answers for HARD questions do so
for at least two out of four of them.
Stochastic behavior in part I and part III is highly correlated at the in-
dividual level. Table 2 presents a regression analysis in which the indica-
tor for stochastic choice in part I is regressed on the indicator for stochas-
tic choice for the same question in part III while clustering standard
errors by subject. The first regression considers all questions; the second
one focuses onHARDones. It shows a positive and significant correlationThis content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 53between the tendency to exhibit stochastic choice in parts I and III at the
individual level.
Table 3 classifies subjects according to their behavior in parts I and III
in light of the model predictions discussed in Section II. Several patterns
emerge. First, the behavior of the vast majority of subjects (90 percent) is
consistent with expected utility (EU) or with one of the three models de-
scribed in Section II: REU*, DDM*, or CSCmodels. Second, very few sub-
jects (6 percent) never report inconsistent answers and are categorized
as being consistent with standard expected utility. Third, there is a signif-
icant fraction of subjects (23 percent) who exhibit stochastic choice in
EASY and/or HARD questions in part I but never in part III, which isTABLE 2
Regression Analysis of Stochastic Choice
Stochastic Choice Distant
Repetitions (Part I)
(1) (2) (3)
Stochastic Choice
Repetitions in a Row
(Part III)
(4)
Stochastic choice in
repetitions in a row .35**
(.04)
.14**
(.06)
Flip coin .23**
(.06)
.27**
(.07)
Constant .18**
(.02)
.40**
(.04)
.18**
(.01)
.22**
(.02)
Observations 560 320 800 560
N subjects 80 80 80 80
R 2 .1139 .0223 .0169 .0262
Sample of questions All HARD All AllThis content d
All use subject to University oownloaded from 131.215.070.231 on Mar
f Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (hNote.—Random-effects GLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject
level. Each observation corresponds to an individual behavior for one of the 10 (seven)
questions subjects faced repeatedly in part I with distant repetitions (part III with repeti-
tions in a row). The dependent variable in cols. 1–3 is an indicator of stochastic choice with
distant repetitions (part I). The dependent variable in col. 4 is an indicator of stochastic
choice with repetitions in a row (part III). The flip coin variable is a dummy variable that
takes value one if the subject chose the costly coin in that question and zero otherwise.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.TABLE 3
Classiﬁcation of Subjects according to the Theoretical Models
Model
Stochastic Choice
Distant Repetitions
Stochastic Choice
Repetitions in a Row
Fraction of
Subjects
Number of
Subjects
EU No No 6% 5
REU* Yes except FOSD No }23% 18DDM* Yes No
CSC Yes except FOSD Yes except FOSD 61% 49
Other (1) Yes in FOSD Yes in EASY and/or HARD 6% 5
Other (2) No Yes in HARD 4% 3
Total 100% 80ch 09, 2017 1
ttp://www.jo0:15:30 AM
urnals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Allconsistent with both REU* andDDM*models. Finally, themajority of sub-
jects (61 percent) exhibit stochastic choice behavior in both parts I and III,
which is consistent only with models of deliberate randomization.13B. Flip of the Costly CoinA much smaller but still sizable fraction of the subjects (29 percent)
choose the option to flip a costly coin. Similarly to the behavior observed
in parts I and III, the coin was chosen virtually only for HARD questions:
24 percent of subjects selected it in HARD questions, while only 8 per-
cent did so in EASY and 4 percent in FOSD questions (Fisher exact test,
p5 .008 for HARD vs. EASY, p5 .0004 for HARD vs. FOSD, and p5 .495
for EASY vs. FOSD). Those who choose the coin tend to do so frequently:
42 percent of those who ever chose it did so in at least two out of four
HARD questions.
Table 2 presents a regression analysis in which the indicator for sto-
chastic choice in part I or part III is regressed on the indicator for choos-
ing a coin in the samequestionwhile clustering standard errors by subject.
The results indicate that subjects who choose the coin are significantly
more likely to report inconsistent answers in both parts.
The choice of the costly coin has implications for the theoretical mod-
els. According to REU (and not only REU*), subjects should never choose
the costly coin because they follow expected utility once they face a ques-
tion. Models of bounded rationality and of deliberate randomization are
instead compatible with both choosing and not choosing the coin.14 This
allows us to further refine the classification in table 3: of the 18 subjects
classified as either REU* or DDM*, three chose the coin at least once and
thus cannot belong to the former group.C. Stochastic Choice and Expected ValuesTable 4 summarizes the results of a regression analysis in which the indi-
cator for stochastic choice in part I or in part III is regressed on dummy
variables for the difficulty of questions and on question type specific ab-
solute differences in individual expected utilities. For the latter, we con-
sider risk-neutral—thus indicating the difference in expected values—as13 These models are also consistent with the observed correlation of stochastic choice in
the two parts: intuitively, it is the same desire to hedge that applies in both cases (even
though it may not necessarily lead to the same behavior because the agent does not know
the number of repetitions in part I).
14 With models of deliberate randomization, on the one hand, the agent may find an
advantage in using a randomization device, especially if she does not know if questions will
be repeated; on the other hand, the agent may be able to randomize herself and thus not
need to pay for the coin.
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TABLE 4
Determinants of Stochastic Choice
Stochastic Choice with Distant Repetitions (Part I)
Risk-Neutral Utility CRRA Utility CARA Utility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy for EASY 2.010
(.06)
2.045
(.087)
.0002
(.042)
2.04
(.07)
2.018
(.05)
2.03
(.07)
Dummy for HARD .49**
(.04)
.39**
(.07)
.48**
(.03)
.43**
(.05)
.49**
(.03)
.49**
(.06)
Difference in
EU FOSD 2.0003
(.0005)
2.0005
(.0007)
2.0003
(.0006)
2.001
(.002)
2.043
(.13)
2.59
(1.76)
Difference in
EU EASY 2.0002
(.001)
1.13 e217
(.002)
2.0006
(.001)
1.69 e218
(.004)
.048
(.23)
2 e216
(.49)
Difference in
EU HARD 2.012
(.006)
.008
(.0009)
2.023**
(.007)
.0056
(.03)
23.37**
(1.03)
27.73
(4.91)
Constant .027
(.027)
.045
(.04)
.024
(.025)
.04
(.038)
.02
(.024)
.03
(.04)
Observations 780 350 780 350 780 350
N subjects 78 35 78 35 78 35
Overall R 2 .3089 .32 .3164 .3183 .3156 .3228
Set of subjects All Risk averse &
not Allais
All Risk averse &
not Allais
All Risk averse &
not Allais
Stochastic Choice with Repetitions in a Row (Part III)
Risk-Neutral Utility CRRA Utility CARA Utility
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dummy HARD .40**
(.07)
.38**
(.11)
.47**
(.05)
.43**
(.09)
.45**
(.06)
.38**
(.09)
Difference in
EU EASY .001
(.002)
.0008
(.002)
.0017
(.002)
.001
(.006)
.29
(.37)
.18
(.75)
Difference in
EU HARD .004
(.007)
.02
(.01)
2.026**
(.008)
.027
(.04)
22.14
(1.28)
10.01
(5.46)
Constant 2.003
(.07)
.02
(.10)
2.0007
(.05)
.025
(.09)
2.003
(.06)
.03
(.09)
Observations 468 210 468 210 468 210
N subjects 78 35 78 35 78 35
Overall R 2 .1593 .1967 .1822 .1905 .168 .1955
Set of subjects All Risk averse &
not Allais
All Risk averse &
not Allais
All Risk averse &
not Allais
Sample of
questions EASY &
HARD
EASY &
HARD
EASY &
HARD
EASY &
HARD
EASY &
HARD
EASY &
HARDTh
All use subject to is content downloaded from
University of Chicago Press 131.215.070.231 on Marc
 Terms and Conditions (htth 09, 2017 1
p://www.joNote.—Random-effects GLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject
level. Each observation corresponds to the behavior of one subject in one of the 10 (seven)
questions subjects faced repeatedly in part I with distant repetitions (in part III with repe-
titions in a row). For risk-neutral utilities, we used the identity function. For CRRA, we es-
timated the parameter r > 0 of the utility function uðxÞ 5 x12r=ð1 2 rÞ. For CARA, we es-
timated the parameter b > 0 of the utility function uðxÞ 5 1 2 e2bx . These estimates are
based on the subject-specific answer to the risky investment task in part II (question 1).
(Two subjects are excluded because they reported an investment of zero, and thus the pa-
rameters cannot be estimated.) Dummy HARD denotes a dummy variable that takes the
value one if a question is in the HARD category, and zero otherwise. The difference in
EU FOSD (EASY, HARD) variable is the interaction between the absolute difference in ex-
pected utilities of lotteries and the dummy for FOSD (EASY, HARD). Risk averse and not
Allais indicates the subset of subjects who are risk averse according to the risky investment
task in part II (question 1) and who do not violate the principles of expected utility in their
answers in part IV.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.0:15:30 AM
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Allwell as constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) functional forms. For these, the individual-specific param-
eters were estimated using the answers to the investment task in part II
(question 1). These estimations aremeaningful for subjects who reported
a strictly positive risky investment, which leaves us with a sample of 78 sub-
jects. Of these, 30 subjects are either risk neutral or risk loving because
they invested their entire budget. Regressions 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 include
these 30 subjects, treating them as risk neutral, while regressions 2, 4, 6, 8,
10, and 12 exclude them as well as the subjects who violated expected util-
ity as measured by Allais-type behavior in part IV of the experiment.
The analysis shows that the similarity in expected values or expected
utilities does not account for the full variation in the stochastic behavior
between HARD and other types of questions in either part I or part III:
the coefficient of the dummy variable HARD is both large and highly sig-
nificant in all regressions, even when we control for the differences in
expected values or in subject-specific expected utilities. This holds when
we consider either all subjects or those who do not exhibit Allais-type be-
havior and who are risk averse. In some specifications (regressions 3, 5,
and 9), the differences in expected utilities significantly affect stochastic
behavior withinHARDquestions, but this effect is not robust with respect
to the utility specification or to the subset of considered subjects. In par-
ticular, it disappears if we focus on risk-averse subjects who do not exhibit
Allais-type behavior (the group for which we have reasonablemeasures of
the utility). In online appendix A, we present additional regressions that
show that these results are robust to different specifications.
Our finding is not compatible with the many models of stochastic
choice that imply a relation between stochastic choice and expected util-
ity difference. These include the DDM (and not only DDM*) and many
other models of bounded rationality, for example, models of trembles as
in Harless and Camerer (1994).
Our results above may appear incompatible with the finding docu-
mented in many experiments according to which stochastic choice is
more prevalent when the difference in expected values or expected utili-
ties of lotteries is smaller (e.g.,Mosteller andNogee 1951; Kable andGlim-
cher 2007). To reconcile our findings with this literature, note that these
experiments have predominantly focused on the differences in expected
values and/or utilities. Because these tend to be smaller for hard ques-
tions, the two effects are conflated. By contrast, in our experiment, ques-
tions were designed in a way that allows us to separate these two forces.
Before proceeding, we briefly mention two other possible interpreta-
tions of stochastic choice. First, subjects could be simply indifferent be-
tween the available options. This implies that stochastic choice should
be present only when these have very similar expected utilities. Moreover,
because indifference is such a knife-edge case, stochastic choice must beThis content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 57limited. As we have seen, neither implication is true in our data. Alter-
natively, stochasticity of choice could be due to “preference discovery”:
subjects could be forming their preferences in the course of the experi-
ment. This implies that the stochasticity of choice should become less fre-
quent as we proceed in the experiment. This is also not supported in our
data, as 71 percent of subjects report stochastic choice in part III of the
experiment.D. QuestionnairesOne way to gain some insights into the motivation behind subjects’ be-
havior is to ask them directly. We have done so at the end of the exper-
iment in a nonincentivized questionnaire in which we asked “In Part III
of the experiment eachquestionwas asked to you three times. If you chose
different options, could you please tell us why did you do it? (Please elab-
orate).”15
As the question had an open answer, we used the following procedure
to analyze the responses. Two undergraduate students from Columbia
University were hired as research assistants to code them. Each was given
written guidelines instructing him or her to classify subjects into one of
six categories, which are listed in table 5.16 These research assistants were
not privy to the research questions posed in this paper. Overall, we ob-
serve a very high consensus among the two research assistants on how
to classify subjects: they disagree for only four out of 79 questionnaires
(one subject did not fill out the questionnaire at all), and the correlation
in their classifications was .994 (p < .01). In the analysis below, we focus
on 75 subjects for which there were no disagreements (none of our qual-
itative results would change if we included subjects with disagreements
following any of the two coders; see online app.H). Furthermore, for sub-
jects classified as deliberately reporting stochastic answers, we gave the
assistants a list of possible reasons for this choice—arguments invoking
hedging, diversification, riskiness of different options, optimizing ones’
earnings, delegation of decision, and the difficulty of choice—and asked
them to select the reasons, possiblymore than one, closest to the subject’s
answer. For this task, we observemore variability in the coders’ responses;
the correlation between coders was .62 (p < .01). However, the frequen-
cies of motives indicated by two coders were similar, as we will see below.15 The questionnaire also asked other questions (the question above was the second
one; see online app. B for a complete list). We focus on this question as it allows us to dis-
cuss the motivations for stochastic choice.
16 Because all of our experiments were conducted in California, this eliminates the pos-
sibility that one of the research assistants participated as a subject in any of our experimen-
tal sessions. The complete instructions for the coders are presented in online app. F.
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AllTable 5 reports the classification of subjects into the six categories, fo-
cusing on all subjects as well as on those who exhibited stochastic choice
in part III.17 The first check is for the consistency between the answers
and actual behavior: approximately two-thirds of subjects reported giv-
ing inconsistent answers in part III, and among them, all but one actually
did so (48 out of 49 subjects); conversely, among those who actually re-
ported inconsistent answers in part III, only two subjects reported that
they never did, and two did not answer.
The vast majority of subjects who reported giving inconsistent answers
in part III indicate that they did so deliberately: only one subject reported
giving inconsistent answers because he or she was indifferent between
two options, 12 percent reported changing their mind, and the remain-
ing 79 percent said that they did it on purpose. To illustrate, here are two
randomly chosen answers assigned to the latter group, category 6: “I
wanted to increase my chances of getting more tokens with varied op-
tions” and “some options were not clearly better, would give each a try.”
We now turn to the reasons given for reporting inconsistent answers,
conditional on choosing to do so deliberately. In this exercise, subjectsTABLE 5
Reasons for Stochastic Choice Reported in the Final Questionnaire
Category and Explanation All Subjects
Subjects with Stochastic
Choice in Part III
1. No answer 9 (12%) 2 (4%)
2. No stochastic choice in part III 17 (23%) 2 (4%)
3. Stochastic choice because they
changed their mind about which
option is better 6 (8%) 6 (12%)
4. Stochastic choice unintentionally,
by mistake 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
5. Stochastic choice because they
were indifferent between the
two options 1 (1%) 1 (2%)
6. Stochastic choice because they
deliberately chose to do so 42 (56%) 41 (79%)
Total number of subjects 75 5217 Online app. G includes a list of randomly
of the categories.
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stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 59could belong to more than one group, as they could give more than one
reason. The vast majority of subjects appeal to hedging, diversification,
and differences in the riskiness/safeness of the presented options: 71 per-
cent or 69 percent depending on the coder. The second most popular
explanation mentions some optimization of the earnings: 40 percent or
48 percent. Finally, some subjects mention a desire to delegate the deci-
sion: 10 percent or 12 percent. All other explanations were recorded
fewer than 7 percent of the times.E. Response TimeIn this section, we present the response time analysis. Among other things,
this provides a direct test of the extra assumption we imposed on the DDM
to make predictions regarding the case of repetitions in a row.
We begin by noting that we find no statistical difference in the distri-
bution of response times between participants who reported stochastic
answers for HARD questions and those who did not in part I or III (with
the exception ofHARD1 in part I, in which subjects who gave inconsistent
answers took significantly longer).18 These findings refute the hypothesis
that subjects who reported inconsistent answers in either part of the ex-
periment did so because they did not spend time thinking about their
choice.
Table 6 reports summary statistics of reaction time data for each type
of question in seconds. In online appendix A (table A3), we report the
data for each question separately. Several patterns emerge from this and
from the regression analysis (see online app. A for details). First, subjects
take longer to make a decision for HARD than for FOSD or EASY ques-
tions the first time they encounter a question in both parts I and III (p <
.05 in HARD vs. EASY and HARD vs. FOSD in each part). Second, the18 For each question, we run a separate random-effects generalized least squares (GLS)
regression in which we regress the observed response times on the dummy variable that
indicates whether or not a subject gave inconsistent answers for the same question, cluster-
ing standard errors at the individual level. The estimated coefficients on the dummy vari-
ables in each regression are not significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level: for
part I, p 5 .087 in HARD1, p 5 .082 in HARD2, p 5 .264 in HARD3, and p 5 .876 in
HARD4; and for part III, p 5 .274 in HARD1, p 5 .834 in HARD2, p 5 .826 in HARD3,
and p 5 .179 in HARD4. Throughout this section, we will use a regression analysis of this
type to compare response times between different types of questions, different repetitions
of the questions, and different subsets of subjects. When we say that there is a significant
difference in response times between two groups (or two types of questions or two repeti-
tions of questions), we mean that the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable that in-
dicates one of the groups (types or repetitions) is significantly different from zero at the
5 percent level. In all such comparisons, we report the p-value associated with the dummy
variable in the regression. Tables A4 and A5 in online app. A present a detailed summary of
these regressions and summary statistics for the response times of subjects that reported
consistent and inconsistent answers in HARD questions in parts I and III.
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Allfirst repetition takes longer than the second (p < .05 in all pairwise com-
parisons), while response times in later repetitions are often not statisti-
cally different from each other at the 5 percent level.
An important finding for our analysis is a comparison between re-
sponse times in the repetitions of HARD questions in parts I and III.
In part I, subjects take a relatively long time to answer each of the three
repetitions. Instead, in part III, they take a relatively long time only the
first time they encounter a question—a median of 7 seconds—while the
next two repetitions are answered almost immediately—with a median of
2 seconds and with no difference between the repetitions (HARD ques-
tions in part III: p < .01 when comparing first vs. second repetitions and
p5 .49 when comparing second vs. third repetitions). Subjects take signif-
icantly longer to answer the second or the third repetition of the HARD
questions in part I than in part III (p < .01 in both tests). These results
hold also when we focus on the subset of subjects who gave inconsistent
answers in part III (see online app. A).
To interpret these numbers, we take as a benchmark the response times
in the second and third repetitions of the FOSD question in part III: these
are naturally the easiest questions in the experiment, in which we expect
subjects to recognize the dominant option in the first repetition and to
simply implement the same choice in later repetitions without much
thought (indeed, all subjects choose the dominant option every time). Re-
sponse time in these repetitions can be seen as the time necessary tomove
the mouse across the screen to make a choice.19 We find that response
times in the second and third repetitions of HARD questions in part IIITABLE 6
Mean (Median) Response Time for Each Type of Question, in Seconds
FOSD EASY HARD
Repetition Part I Part III Part I Part III Part I Part III
First 6.5 (5) 2.9 (3) 4.8 (4) 3.6 (3) 14.3 (10) 10 (7)
Second 4.3 (3) 1.7 (1) 3.9 (3) 1.9 (2) 9.6 (7) 2.6 (2)
Third 3.4 (3) 1.7 (1) 3.4 (3) 1.6 (2) 7.2 (6) 2.4 (2)19 Our software
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stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 61are statistically indistinguishable from those in the second and third repe-
titions of FOSD questions in part III.20
The analysis of response times is consistent with the view that in-a-
row repetitions of the same question are not treated as entirely new ques-
tions and are different from distant repetitions. This is in line with the
assumptions that we have made to extend existing models to our setup
in Section II. These findings also allow us to directly test the assumption
made to extend the DDM model to the case of repetitions in a row
(DDM*). Within that model, the very short response times observed in
the second and third consecutive repetitions are consistent with the
assumption that subjects do not gather more information when they ob-
serve the same question asked repeatedly in a row.F. Relation with Risk Attitudes and Violations of Expected Utility
We conclude the analysis by studying the relation between stochastic
choice, the attitudes toward risk and compound lotteries, measured in
part II, and Allais-type questions, measured in part IV.
Looking at part II, we find that the majority of subjects (63 percent)
are risk averse and a large majority either strictly dislike compound lot-
teries (43 percent of subjects) or are neutral (54 percent of subjects).
Risk-averse subjects are those who invest fewer than the maximum num-
ber of tokens in the first investment task in part II. We observe an aver-
age investment of 69.6 tokens, in line with typical results (Dreber and
Hoffman 2007; Langer and Weber 2008; Charness and Gneezy 2010).
The attitude toward compound lotteries is measured by comparing the
investments in the two questions in part II: a compound averse (neutral,
loving) subject invests strictly less (equal, more) in the compound lottery
question than in the risk question. A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
ranks test detects a statistical difference between the investment in the
two questions at the 1 percent level (z 5 4.963 and p < .01).
Looking at part IV, 25 percent of subjects violate expected utility prin-
ciples according to either the common consequences effect or the com-
mon ratio effect, the so-called Allais paradoxes, which are the most widely
used tests in the literature. This proportion is in line with other experi-
ments that use similar incentive structures (e.g., Camerer 1989b; Conlisk
1989; Burke et al. 1996; Fan 2002; Huck and Müller 2012).
Table 7 reports the Spearman correlations between the tendency to re-
port stochastic choice and attitudes toward risk, compound lotteries, and
Allais-type behavior. While the former two are, with one exception, not20 Regression analysis confirms that there is no statistical difference (at the 5 percent
level) between the median decision time subjects took in the second and third repetitions
of FOSD vs. HARD questions in part III (p > .05).
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Allrelated to the stochastic behavior in parts I and III, we find a positive and
significant correlation between these and the tendency to exhibit Allais-like
violations of expected utility: corr. 5 .19 (p 5 .0985) and corr. 5 .22 (p 5
.0451) for parts I and III.
We conclude the discussion by noting that the documented relation
between stochastic choice and Allais-type behavior is one of the predic-
tions of the CSC model (see Cerreia-Vioglio et al. 2016). Intuitively, in
this model, the stochasticity of choice emerges because the agent has
a desire to “hedge” between options because of the multiplicity of utili-
ties (the set W). This same multiplicity generates an Allais-like behavior
with an attraction toward degenerate lotteries: in this model, when the
agent has multiple utilities, she is “pessimistic” in her evaluation of non-
degenerate lotteries, while degenerate ones are not affected (as their cer-
tainty equivalent is the same for any utility). This generates an Allais-
like behavior. Thus, subjects with a larger set of utilities should be
(weakly) more prone to both stochastic choice and Allais-type behav-
ior—generating the relation documented in our data.21TABLE 7
Correlation between Stochastic Choice and Preferences under Risk
Stochastic Choice
Distant Repetitions
(Part I)
Stochastic Choice
Repetitions in a Row
(Part III) Flip a Coin
Risky investment 2.12 (p > .1) 2.09 (p > .1) 2.04 (p > .1)
Risk averse (indicator) .26** (p 5 .0208) .14 (p > .1) .15 (p > .1)
Compound investment 2.08 (p > .1) 2.05 (p > .1) .01 (p > .1)
Compound (indicator) .12 (p > .1) .10 (p > .1) 2.04 (p > .1)
Allais-like behavior .19* (p 5 .0985) .22** (p 5 .0451) .16 (p > .1)21 More precisely, in the C
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stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 63V. Robustness: Three Short ExperimentsIn this section, we report the results of three short experiments designed
to investigate the robustness of our findings. Short experiment 1 asks
questions similar to those of our main experiment (a choice between lot-
teries) but with much higher stakes and many fewer questions. Short ex-
periments 2 and 3 follow a similar methodology but ask questions in dif-
ferent domains: time preferences and social preferences. The complete
instructions for all short experiments are presented in online appendix B.A. Short Experiment 1: Lotteries, High StakesThe experiment was conducted at the California Institute of Technology
with 26 undergraduate students using pen and paper. After the instruc-
tions were read aloud to the subjects, they were asked to answer question
HARD2 (see table 1) three times in a row, each time on a separate sheet
of paper. As in part III of our main experiment, subjects were explicitly
told about this repetition. At the end of the experiment, one participant
rolled a die to determine which of the three repetitions would deter-
mine the payments. To further increase the stakes, we used amuch higher
conversion rate: 2 tokens5 $1 (instead of 20 tokens5 $1, as in the main
experiment). This change made the stakes unusually high (winnings up
to $45withprobability .5), considering that the entire experiment, includ-
ing the instruction period, lasted 15 minutes in total.
Short experiment 1 has several differences from our main experiment:
(a) it involves extremely high stakes; (b) only one question was asked,
three times, sharply reducing the cognitive load; (c) it is performed in iso-
lation from part I of the main treatment (in which subjects were exposed
to the option of flipping a coin between available lotteries); (d ) it in-
volves a different population, with high average computational skills;22
and (e) the randomization that determined which repetition matters for
payments was performed by a participant, eliminating trust issues.22 Undergraduate students at Caltech have very high average computational skills (Scho-
lastic Aptitude Test scores) and receive substantial training in math and probabilities. The
advantage of confirming our results with this population is that it shows that the desire to
randomize is present also for subjects who understand probabilities and distributions. This
should eliminate the concern that the desire to randomize was found because subjects
were asked to make choices with objects that they were deeply unfamiliar with.
jWj < ∞ and the agent exhibits Allais-like behavior, then she should also exhibit stochastic
choice, again in some range of prizes (see Cerreia-Vioglio et al. 2015). However, note that
this does not imply that subjects who exhibit stochastic choice must exhibit Allais-like be-
havior for any range of prizes or questions: first, because in the CSC model, subjects can
abide by expected utility in some range of prizes and not in others; second, because spe-
cific Allais questions may not be properly calibrated to capture non–expected utility in a
given range, a well-known issue with small incentives (see Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger,
and Ortoleva 2015).
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AllWe observe that 50 percent of subjects (13 out of 26) chose different
lotteries in the repetition of the same question. This fraction is not sig-
nificantly different, at the 5 percent level, from the 45 percent of subjects
who reported different answers in the same HARD2 question in part III
of the main experiment (Fisher exact test, p 5 .821).B. Short Experiment 2: Time PreferencesShort experiment 2 has a design very similar to that of short experiment 1,
but instead of lotteries, the choice is between bundles of payments deliv-
ered at different dates. Subjects face the choice between two options: op-
tion 1: $12 today and $10 in 2 weeks; option 2: $3 today and $22 in
2 weeks.
The two options were designed to keep the transaction cost constant,
as both require subjects to come back to the lab and pick up the second
portion of their payment 2 weeks later. Except for the difference in the
objects of choice, short experiment 2 was identical to short experiment 1:
subjects were asked to choose between the options above three times in a
row after being explicitly told that the question would be repeated three
times. This was the only task. At the end of the experiment, one of the
repetitions was randomly chosen to determine the final payments. Short
experiment 2 was conducted at the Experimental Social Science Labo-
ratory (ESSL) at University of California, Irvine, with 47 undergraduate
students.23
We find that 34 percent of subjects (16 out of 47 participants) reported
different answers in the three repetitions of the question. While smaller
(at the 5 percent level) than the fraction of subjects who reported differ-
ent answers in short experiment 1 (Fisher exact test, p 5 .045), this still
represents a sizable fraction of the population, similar to that observed
for some HARD questions in our main experiment.C. Short Experiment 3: Social PreferencesShort experiment 3 follows an identical design, but subjects were asked
to choose between vectors of monetary allocations to themselves and to
two other subjects. They were asked to choose between the following op-
tions: option 1: you get $13, person 1 gets $13, person 2 gets $13; option 2:
you get $17, person 1 gets $27, person 2 gets $1.23 Short experiments 2 and 3 were conducted at the end of experimental sessions in
which the subjects participated in an unrelated experiment. Because these short experi-
ments lasted less than 15 minutes and were not the main task for which students were in
vited to the lab, we paid only a fraction of students for this additional task (six out of 47 stu-
dents were randomly selected to receive payments for short experiment 2).
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stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 65The roles of person 1 and person 2 were randomly allocated to two
other participants, keeping their identities secret. The two options above
capture the well-known equality-efficiency trade-off: Option 1 gives an
equal allocation but a lower total surplus ($39); option 2 gives a higher
surplus ($45) and a higher payment to the decision maker, but members
have very unequal shares. We used the exact same amounts as in Bolton
and Ockenfels (2006), except we used US dollars instead of deutsche
marks.
The structure of short experiment 3 was identical to the structure of
short experiment 2: subjects had to choose one of the two presented op-
tions three times in a row and were told in advance of the repetitions.
Short experiment 3 was conducted at ESSL at University of California,
Irvine, with 57 undergraduate students, and no student participated in
both short experiment 2 and short experiment 3.24
We find that 42 percent of subjects (24 out of 57 participants) reported
stochastic answers. This fraction is not significantly different (at the
5 percent level) from the fraction of students who reported stochastic
answers in short experiment 2 (Fisher exact test, p 5 .578) or those
who reported stochastic answers in short experiment 1 (Fisher exact test,
p 5 .096).VI. ConclusionIn this paper, we study experimentally the origin of stochastic choice. We
ask subjects to choose from the same set of options multiple times under
two conditions: with repetitions of the same question distant from each
other and with repetitions in a row. We find that subjects exhibit stochas-
tic choice in both cases, with stochasticity highly correlated. In three ro-
bustness tests, we confirm that similar behavior holds also for high stakes,
different subject pools, and questions in different domains. Overall, our
results indicate that the desire to randomize plays an important role in
driving stochastic choice.References
Ahn, David S., and Todd Sarver. 2013. “Preference for Flexibility and Random
Choice.” Econometrica 81 (1): 341–61.
Allais, Maurice. 1953. “Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque:
Critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école américaine.” Econometrica 21:503–
46.
Apesteguia, Jose, and Miguel A. Ballester. Forthcoming. “Monotone Stochastic
Choice Models: The Case of Risk and Time Preferences.” J.P.E.24 Similarly to short experiment 2, in short experiment 3, 12 out of 57 students were ran-
domly selected to receive payments for this experiment.
This content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
66 journal of political economy
AllBallinger, T. Parker, and Nathaniel T. Wilcox. 1997. “Decisions, Error and Het-
erogeneity.” Econ. J. 107 (443): 1090–1105.
Barberá, Salvador, and Prasanta K. Pattanaik. 1986. “Falmagne and the Rational-
izability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings.” Econometrica
54:707–15.
Becker, Gordon M., Morris H. DeGroot, and Jacob Marschak. 1963a. “An Exper-
imental Study of Some StochasticModels forWagers.”Behavioral Sci. 8 (3): 199–
202.
———. 1963b. “StochasticModelsofChoiceBehavior.”Behavioral Sci.8(1): 41–55.
Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels. 2006. “Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and
Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment.” A.E.R.
96:1906–11.
Burke, Michael S., John R. Carter, Robert D. Gominiak, and Daniel F. Ohl. 1996.
“An Experimental Note on the Allais Paradox and Monetary Incentives.” Em-
pirical Econ. 21 (4): 617–32.
Busemeyer, Jerome R., and James T. Townsend. 1993. “Decision Field Theory: A
Dynamic-Cognitive Approach to Decision Making in an Uncertain Environ-
ment.” Psychological Rev. 100 (3): 432–59.
Camerer, Colin F. 1989a. “Does the Basketball Market Believe in the ‘HotHand’?”
A.E.R. 79 (5): 1257–61.
———. 1989b. “An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories.”
J. Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1): 61–104.
———. 1995. “Individual Decision Making.” In Handbook of Experimental Econom-
ics, vol. 2, edited by A. Roth and J. Kagel, 587–703. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press.
Camerer, Colin F., and Teck-Hua Ho. 1994. “Violations of the Betweenness Axiom
and Nonlinearity in Probability.” J. Risk and Uncertainty 8 (2): 167–96.
Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva. 2015. “Cau-
tious Expected Utility and the Certainty Effect.” Econometrica 83 (2): 693–728.
Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone, David Dillenberger, Pietro Ortoleva, and Gil Riella.
2016. “Deliberately Stochastic.” Manuscript, Columbia Univ.
Charness, Gary, and Uri Gneezy. 2010. “Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An
Experiment.” Econ. Inquiry 48 (1): 133–46.
Chen, Yuh-Jia, and James E. Corter. 2006. “When Mixed Options Are Preferred
in Multiple-Trial Decisions.” J. Behavioral Decision Making 19 (1): 17–42.
Clark, Stephen A. 1996. “The Random Utility Model with an Infinite Choice
Space.” Econ. Theory 7 (1): 179–89.
Cohen, Michael A. 1980. “Random Utility Systems—the Infinite Case.” J. Math.
Psychology 22 (1): 1–23.
Conlisk, John. 1989. “Three Variants on the Allais Example.” A.E.R. 79 (3): 392–
407.
DeMartino, Benedetto,DharshanKumaran,BenSeymour, andRaymond J.Dolan.
2006. “Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the Human Brain.” Sci-
ence 313 (5787): 684–87.
Dreber, Anna, and Moshe Hoffman. 2007. “2D: 4D and Risk Aversion: Evidence
That the Gender Gap in Preferences Is Partly Biological.” Manuscript, Stock-
holm School Econ.
Dwenger, Nadja, Dorothea Kübler, and Georg Weizsäcker. 2016. “Flipping a
Coin: Theory and Evidence.” Manuscript, Humboldt-Universität Berlin.
Eliaz, Kfir, and Guillaume Fréchette. 2008. “Don’t Put All Your Eggs in One Bas-
ket! An Experimental Study of False Diversification.” Manuscript, New York
Univ.This content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
stochastic choice and preferences for randomization 67Falmagne, Jean-Claude. 1978. “A Representation Theorem for Random Finite
Scale Systems.” J. Math. Psychology 18:52–72.
Fan, Chinn-Ping. 2002. “Allais Paradox in the Small.” J. Econ. Behavior and Org. 49
(3): 411–21.
Fudenberg, Drew, Ryota Iijima, and Tomasz Strzalecki. 2015. “Stochastic Choice
and Revealed Perturbed Utility.” Econometrica 83 (6): 2371–2409.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Tomasz Strzalecki. 2015. “Recursive Logit with Choice
Aversion.” Econometrica 83 (2): 651–91.
Gneezy, Uri, and Jan Potters. 1997. “An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evalua-
tion Periods.” Q. J.E. 112 (2): 631–45.
Gul, Faruk, Paulo Natenzon, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2014. “Random Choice
as Behavioral Optimization.” Econometrica 82 (5): 1873–1912.
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2006. “Random Expected Utility.” Econo-
metrica 74 (1): 121–46.
Harless, David W., and Colin F. Camerer. 1994. “The Predictive Utility of Gener-
alized Expected Utility Theories.” Econometrica 62:1251–89.
Harsanyi, John C. 1973. “Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Ratio-
nale forMixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points.” Internat. J. Game Theory 2 (1): 1–23.
Henderson, Vicky, David Hobson, and Alex S. L. Tse. 2014. “Randomized Strat-
egies and Prospect Theory in a Dynamic Context.” Soc. Sci. Res. Network,
no. 2531457.
Hey, John D. 2001. “Does Repetition Improve Consistency?” Experimental Econ. 4
(1): 5–54.
Hey, John D., and Enrica Carbone. 1995. “Stochastic Choice with Deterministic
Preferences: An Experimental Investigation.” Econ. Letters 47 (2): 161–67.
Hey, John D., and Chris Orme. 1994. “Investigating Generalizations of Expected
Utility Theory Using Experimental Data.” Econometrica 62:1291–1326.
Huck, Steffen, and Wieland Müller. 2012. “Allais for All: Revisiting the Paradox
in a Large Representative Sample.” J. Risk and Uncertainty 44 (3): 261–93.
Johnson, Eric J., and Roger Ratcliff. 2013. “Computational and Process Models
of Decision Making in Psychology and Behavioral Economics.” In Neuroeco-
nomics: Decision Making and the Brain, edited by Paul W. Glimcher and Ernst
Fehr, 35–48. New York: Academic Press.
Kable, Joseph W., and Paul W. Glimcher. 2007. “The Neural Correlates of Subjec-
tive Value during Intertemporal Choice.” Nature Neuroscience 10 (12): 1625–33.
Kircher, Philipp, Sandra Ludwig, and Alvaro Sandroni. 2013. “On the Difference
between Social and Private Goods.” BE J. Theoretical Econ. 13 (1).
Langer, Thomas, and Martin Weber. 2008. “Does Commitment or Feedback In-
fluence Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis.” J. Econ. Behavior
and Org. 67 (3): 810–19.
Levy, Dino J., Amalie C. Thavikulwat, and Paul W. Glimcher. 2013. “State Depen-
dent Valuation: The Effect of Deprivation on Risk Preferences.” PloS ONE 8
(1): e53978.
Loomes, Graham, and Robert Sugden. 1995. “Incorporating a Stochastic Ele-
ment into Decision Theories.” European Econ. Rev. 39 (3): 641–48.
Luce, R. Duncan. 1958. “A Probabilistic Theory of Utility.” Econometrica 26:193–
224.
———. 1959. Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Wiley.
Machina, Mark J. 1985. “Stochastic Choice Functions Generated from Determin-
istic Preferences over Lotteries.” Econ. J. 95 (379): 575–94.
Marley, Anthony. 1997. “Probabilistic Choice as a Consequence of Nonlinear
(Sub) Optimization.” J. Math. Psychology 41 (4): 382–91.This content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
68 journal of political economy
AllMcFadden, Daniel. 2006. “Revealed Stochastic Preference: A Synthesis.” In Ratio-
nality and Equilibrium, edited by Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Rosa L. Matzkin,
Daniel L. McFadden, James C. Moore, and Nicholas C. Yannelis, 1–20. Vol. 26
of Studies in Economic Theory. Berlin: Springer.
McFadden, Daniel, and Marcel K. Richter. 1991. “Stochastic Rationality and Re-
vealed Stochastic Preference.” In Preferences, Uncertainty, and Rationality, edited
by J. Chipman, D. McFadden, and K. Richter, 161–86. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Mosteller, Frederick, and Philip Nogee. 1951. “An Experimental Measurement
of Utility.” J.P.E. 59 (5): 371–404.
Natenzon, Paulo. 2015. “Random Choice and Learning.” Manuscript, Washing-
ton Univ.
Ratcliff, Roger. 1978. “A Theory of Memory Retrieval.” Psychological Rev. 85 (2):
59–108.
Ratcliff, Roger, and Gail McKoon. 2008. “The Diffusion Decision Model: Theory
and Data for Two-Choice Decision Tasks.” Neural Computation 20 (4): 873–922.
Regenwetter, Michel, Jason Dana, and Clintin P. Davis-Stober. 2011. “Transitivity
of Preferences.” Psychological Rev. 118 (1): 42–56.
Regenwetter, Michel, and Clintin P. Davis-Stober. 2012. “Behavioral Variability of
Choices versus Structural Inconsistency of Preferences.” Psychological Rev. 119
(2): 408–16.
Rubinstein, Ariel. 2002. “Irrational Diversification in Multiple Decision Prob-
lems.” European Econ. Rev. 46 (8): 1369–78.
Sopher, Barry, and J. Mattison Narramore. 2000. “Stochastic Choice and Consis-
tency in Decision Making under Risk: An Experimental Study.” Theory and De-
cision 48 (4): 323–50.
Starmer, Chris, and Robert Sugden. 1989. “Probability and Juxtaposition Effects:
An Experimental Investigation of the Common Ratio Effect.” J. Risk and Uncer-
tainty 2 (2): 159–78.
Swait, Joffre, and Anthony Marley. 2013. “Probabilistic Choice (Models) as a Re-
sult of Balancing Multiple Goals.” J. Math. Psychology 57 (1–2): 1–14.
Thurstone, Louis L. 1927. “A Law of Comparative Judgment.” Psychological
Rev. 34 (4): 273–86.
Tversky, Amos. 1969. “Intransitivity of Preferences.” Psychological Rev. 76 (1): 31–
48.
Wilcox, Nathaniel T. 2011. “‘Stochastically More Risk Averse’: A Contextual The-
ory of Stochastic Discrete Choice under Risk.” J. Econometrics 162:89–104.
Woodford, Michael. 2014. “Stochastic Choice: An Optimizing Neuroeconomic
Model.” A.E.R. Papers and Proc. 104 (5): 495–500.
Wu, George, and Richard Gonzalez. 1996. “Curvature of the Probability Weight-
ing Function.” Management Sci. 42 (12): 1676–90.This content downloaded from 131.215.070.231 on March 09, 2017 10:15:30 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
